18 October 2007
"Whose World Order? Conflicting Visions" is the title...
16 October 2007
A variety of speakers, including Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein, Tariq Ali, Tony Judt, and John Mearsheimer. Dig it. If and when there's video, I'll post that....
Makes a lot of sense to me. For what it's worth, I'm trying to struggle through Otobiographies; we'll see how that goes...but as far as I can tell, Searle is spot on.
Later: Twelve pages and four hours into Otiose-biographies, I gave up in disgust. If anyone reading this can explain the first twelve pages of this Derridiocy to me in plain English, I'd be both surprised and much obliged. Seriously.
Volume 30, Number 16 · October 27, 1983
The Word Turned Upside Down
Theory and Criticism after Structuralism
by Jonathan Culler
Cornell University Press, 307 pp., $8.95 (paper)
What exactly is deconstruction,
To deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise [p. 86].
There are numerous such strategies but at least three stand out. First, and most important, the deconstructioni
But this move is only a part of a two-step procedure ("un double geste, une double science, une double écriture"—Derrida, Marges, p. 392), and the aim of the second step is "a general displacement of the system" (p. 86); the aim is to resituate, undo, or displace the entire system of values expressed by the classical opposition. This also gives curious results since it now turns out that speech and writing are both forms of "archi-writing,
These terms are the points at which the strains of an attempt to sustain or impose logocentric conclusions make themselves felt in a text, moments of uncanny opacity that can lead to rewarding commentary [p. 213].
One example of such rewarding commentary is Derrida's discovery that Rousseau uses "supplement" in discussing both his sexual experience and his theory of writing: he says both that writing is a supplement (to speech) and that masturbation is a supplement (to sex). Derrida concludes, "within the chain of supplements, it was difficult to separate writing from onanism" (Of Grammatology, p. 165).
A third strategy is to pay close attention to marginal features of the text such as the sort of metaphors that occur in it, because such marginal features "are clues to what is truly important" (p. 146).
Suppose one feels a pain. This causes one to look for a cause and spying, perhaps, a pin, one posits a link and reverses the perceptual or phenomenal order, pain…pin, to produce a causal sequence, pin…pain. "The fragment of the outside world of which we become conscious comes after the effect that has been produced on us and is projected a posteriori as its 'cause"' [p. 86].
So far this does not sound very deconstructive of anything. Culler thinks otherwise, and to get an idea of the deconstructioni
Let us be as explicit as possible about what this simple example implies…. The experience of pain, it is claimed, causes us to discover the pin [his italics] and thus causes the production of a cause [my italics]. To deconstruct causality one must operate with the notion of cause and apply it to causation itself [p. 87].
Thus one is "asserting the indispensabilit
the deconstruction reverses the hierarchical opposition of the causal scheme. The distinction between cause and effect makes the cause an origin, logically and temporally prior. The effect is derived, secondary, dependent upon the cause. Without exploring the reasons for or the implications of this hierarchization
, let us note that, working within the opposition, the deconstruction upsets the hierarchy by producing an exchange of properties. If the effect is what causes the cause to become a cause, then the effect, not the cause, should be treated as the origin. By showing that the argument which elevates cause can be used to favor effect, one uncovers and undoes the rhetorical operation responsible for the hierarchization and one produces a significant displacement [p. 88; my italics].
I believe that far from demonstrating the power of deconstruction,
1. There is nothing whatever in the example to support the view that the effect "causes the production of a cause" or that the effect "causes the cause to become a cause." The experience of pain causes us to look for its cause and thus indirectly causes the discovery of the cause. The idea that it produces the cause is exactly counter to what the example actually shows.
2. The word "origin" is being used in two quite distinct senses. If "origin" means causal origin then the pin is the causal origin of the pain. If "origin" means epistemic origin, how we go about finding out, then the experience of pain is the origin of our discovery of its cause. But it is a simple confusion to conclude from this that there is some unitary sense of "origin" in which "the effect and not the cause should be treated as the origin."
3. There isn't any logical hierarchy between cause and effect in the first place since the two are correlative terms: one is defined in terms of the other. The OED, for example, defines "cause" as "that which produces an effect" and it defines "effect" as "something caused or produced."
4. Contrary to what Culler claims, nothing in the example shows that causation lacks any "rigorous justification,"
The privilege of the phonè does not depend upon a choice that might have been avoided. It corresponds to a moment of the system (let us say, of the "life" of "history" or of "being-as-self-
relationship"). The system of "hearing/unders tanding-oneself -speak," [s'entendre parler] through the phonic substance—which presents itself as a non-exterior, non-worldly and therefore non-empirical or non-contingent signifier—has necessarily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch [my italics], and has even produced the idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, arising from the difference between the worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and non-ideality, universal and non-universal, transcendental and empirical, etc. [Of Grammatology, quoted by Culler, p. 107].
On the face of it, this claim is bizarre. The distinction between speech and writing is simply not very important to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, etc. And of these listed, the only one about whom Derrida offers any evidence for the privileging of the spoken is Plato, who, in Phaedrus, made a few remarks about the impossibility of subjecting written texts to interrogation. Plato points out, correctly, that you can ask questions of a speaking person in a way that you cannot of a written text. Notice that all these philosophers address themselves to issues such as universal and particular, transcendental and empirical, etc. For these philosophers these issues neither arise from the distinction between the oral and the written nor depend on the "privileged" status of the oral. Husserl, one of Derrida's targets, is unusual, though not unique, in thinking that meaning is present in spoken language in a way that is vastly superior to written texts.
On Derrida's account, however, it is essential not only to Husserl, but to philosophy, and indeed to "the history of the world during an entire epoch," including the present, that speech should be mistakenly privileged over writing. If Derrida's claim were to be taken at its face value, I believe that a contrary argument could be given equal or even greater plausibility. From the medieval development of Aristotle's logic through Leibniz's Characteristica
However, the breathtaking implausibility of Derrida's claim suggests that something much deeper is going on, and that we must now investigate. Derrida's strategy in his effort to show that writing is really primary, that speech is really a form of writing, is to identify the features which "the classical concept of writing" attributes to writing and then show that these are features of speech as well. Thus for Derrida both written words and spoken words are repeatable or, as he prefers to say, "iterable"; both are institutional, both can be misunderstood, and perhaps most importantly, both rely on a system of differences.This last feature is crucial to the argument. Derrida's ideas are developed from the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who wrote, "Phonemes are characterized not, as one might think, by their own positive quality but simply by the fact that they are distinct. Phonemes are above all else opposing relative and negative entities" (Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 119). Saussure summarizes this point by saying, "in language there are only differences" (p. 120). Thus, for example, the function of "b" in the English word "bat" depends not on its acoustic properties alone, but rather on the way in which they form part of a class which is different from the classes of acoustic properties of other elements; this difference enables us to distinguish "bat" from "pat," "bed" from "red," etc. Language consists of a system of elements whose essential functioning depends on the differences between the elements of the system.
This is an important point. But notice how Derrida transforms it:
The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each "element"—phoneme or grapheme—being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system [my italics]. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces [Positions, p. 26].
But this involves an important shift from Saussure's insight. The correct claim that the elements of the language only function as elements because of the differences they have from one another is converted into the false claim that the elements "consist of" (Culler) or are "constituted on" (Derrida) the traces of these other elements. "There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces." But the second thesis is not equivalent to the first, nor does it follow from it. From the fact that the elements function the way that they do because of their relations to other elements, it simply does not follow that "nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces."
Indeed, as with Culler's "deconstruction
Phonologism does not brook any objections as long as one conserves the colloquial concepts of speech and writing which form the solid fabric of its argumentation. Colloquial and quotidian conceptions, inhabited besides—uncontr
adictorily enough—by an old history, limited by frontiers that are hardly visible yet all the more rigorous by that very fact.
I would wish rather to suggest that the alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was possible only on one condition: that the "original," "natural," etc., language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing [my italics]. An arche-writing whose necessity and new concept I wish to indicate and outline here; and which I continue to call writing only because it essentially communicates with the vulgar concept of writing. The latter could not have imposed itself historically except by the dissimulation of the arche-writing, by the desire for a speech displacing its other and its double and working to reduce its difference. If I persist in calling that difference writing, it is because, within the work of historical repression, writing was, by its situation, destined to signify the most formidable difference. It threatened the desire for the living speech from the closest proximity, it breached living speech from within and from the very beginning. And as we shall begin to see, difference cannot be thought without the trace [Of Grammatology, p. 56-57].
Furthermore, once the apparatus of talking about traces and differences has been treated as definitive of writing, of textuality, this apparatus is then applied pretty much all over—to experience, to the distinction between presence and absence, to the distinction between reality and representation.
1. Derrida's eccentric reading of the history of Western philosophy, a reading according to which philosophers are supposed to be roundly condemning writing, while privileging spoken language, is not grounded on an actual reading of the texts of the leading figures in the philosophical tradition. Derrida only discusses three major figures in any detail: Plato, Rousseau, and Husserl. Rather it seems motivated by his conviction that everything in logocentrism hinges on this issue. If he can treat the features of a suitably redefined notion of writing as definitive of the issues that philosophy has been concerned with—as definitive of truth, reality, etc.—then he thinks he can deconstruct these notions.
2. The proof that speech is really writing, that writing is prior to speech, is based on a redefinition. By such methods one can prove anything. One can prove that the rich are really poor, the true is really false, etc. The only interest that such an effort might have is in the reasons given for the redefinition.
3. Derrida's redefinition of writing to "reform" the "vulgar concept" is not based on any actual empirical study of the similarities and differences of the two forms. Nothing of the sort. He makes nothing of the fact that speech is spoken and writing is written, for example, or of the fact that, in consequence, written texts tend to persist throughout time in a way that is not characteristic of spoken utterances. Rather, the redefinition is based on a misrepresentati
Michel Foucault once characterized Derrida's prose style to me as "obscurantisme terroriste." The text is written so obscurely that you can't figure out exactly what the thesis is (hence "obscurantisme") and then when one criticizes it, the author says, "Vous m'avez mal compris; vous êtes idiot" (hence "terroriste").
What are the results of deconstruction supposed to be? Characteristica
The trouble with this claim is that it requires us to have some way of distinguishing genuine knowledge from its counterfeits, and justified feelings of mastery from mere enthusiasms generated by a lot of pretentious verbosity. And the examples that Culler and Derrida provide are, to say the least, not very convincing. In Culler's book, we get the following examples of knowledge and mastery: speech is a form of writing (passim), presence is a certain type of absence (p. 106), the marginal is in fact central (p. 140), the literal is metaphorical (p. 148), truth is a kind of fiction (p. 181), reading is a form of misreading (p. 176), understanding is a form of misunderstandin
And there is much much more. Anatomists will no doubt be interested to learn that "what we think of as the innermost spaces and places of the body—vagina, stomach, intestine—are in fact pockets of externality folded in" (p. 198). And logicians will no doubt be interested to learn that logocentrism is really the same as phallocentrism.
I have so far been writing as if we could take Culler's account as an adequate reflection of Derrida's views, but in fact I think Culler makes Derrida look both better and worse than he really is, better in that a lot of the more dreadful aspects of Derrida's philosophy are left out or simply glossed over. Culler, for example, says little about Derrida's deconstruction of the idea that texts represent, at least sometimes, the real world, that is, about Derrida's claim that there is nothing outside the text (il n'y a pas de hors texte), an idea that, as I have noted, is connected to his idea that speech is really writing.
But Derrida also emerges as much more superficial than he is. He emerges as the instigator of various gimmicks for dealing with texts, and Culler doesn't seem to understand the really deep problems that led Derrida into this. Culler seems unaware that Derrida is responding to certain specific theses in Husserl and is using weapons derived in large part from Heidegger to do it (Culler's bibliography contains no references to Husserl and only one to Heidegger). I believe that Derrida's work, at least those portions I have read, is not just a series of muddles and gimmicks. There is in fact a large issue being addressed and a large mistake being made. The philosophical tradition that goes from Descartes to Husserl, and indeed a large part of the philosophical tradition that goes back to Plato, involves a search for foundations: metaphysically certain foundations of knowledge, foundations of language and meaning, foundations of mathematics, foundations of morality, etc. Husserl, for example, sought such foundations by examining the content of his conscious experiences while suspending or "bracketing" the assumption that they referred to an external world. By doing so he hoped to isolate and describe pure and indubitable structures of experience.
Now, in the twentieth century, mostly under the influence of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, we have come to believe that this general search for these sorts of foundations is misguided. There aren't in the way classical metaphysicians supposed any foundations for ethics or knowledge. For example, we can't in the traditional sense found language and knowledge on "sense data" because our sense data are already infused with our linguistic and social practices. Derrida correctly sees that there aren't any such foundations, but he then makes the mistake that marks him as a classical metaphysician. The real mistake of the classical metaphysician was not the belief that there were metaphysical foundations, but rather the belief that somehow or other such foundations were necessary, the belief that unless there are foundations something is lost or threatened or undermined or put in question.
It is this belief that Derrida shares with the tradition he seeks to deconstruct. Derrida sees that the Husserlian project of a transcendental grounding for science, language, and common sense is a failure. But what he fails to see is that this doesn't threaten science, language, or common sense in the least. As Wittgenstein says, it leaves everything exactly as it is. The only "foundation," for example, that language has or needs is that people are biologically, psychologically
One sometimes gets the impression that deconstruction is a kind of game that anyone can play. One could, for example, invent a deconstruction of deconstructioni
One last question: granted that deconstruction has rather obvious and manifest intellectual weaknesses, granted that it should be fairly obvious to the careful reader that the emperor has no clothes, why has it proved so influential among literary theorists? Let us make the question sharper: we live in something of a golden age in the philosophy of language. It is not only the age of the great dead giants, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, but also the age of Chomsky and Quine, of Austin, Tarski, Grice, Dummett, Davidson, Putnam, Kripke, Strawson, Montague, and a dozen other first-rate writers. It is the age of generative grammar and speech act theory, of truth-condition
No doubt all of these theories are, in their various ways, mistaken, defective, and provisional, but for clarity, rigor, precision, theoretical comprehensivene
People who try to hold the assumption that genuine distinctions must be made rigid are ripe for Derrida's attempt to undermine all such distinctions. Culler, by the way, shares this assumption. For example, he claims that the fact that an expression can be both used and mentioned in the same sentence somehow weakens the distinction that philosophers and logicians make between the use and mention of expressions (pp. 119-120). In the same vein, he supposes that the fact that a single utterance might express a conscious speech act of one type and an unconscious one of another type is a serious problem for the theory of speech acts (p. 124). He also mistakenly supposes that the theory of speech acts seeks some sort of precise dividing line between what is and what is not a promise (p. 135). But in fact it is a consequence of the theory that in real life there can be all sorts of marginal cases within each family of speech acts.
Second, and equally positivistic, is the insistence that concepts that apply to language and literature, if they are to be truly valid, must admit of some mechanical procedure of verification. Thus, for example, if one attempts to characterize the role of intention in language, many literary critics immediately demand some mechanical criterion for ascertaining the presence and content of intentions. But, of course, there are no such criteria. How do we tell what a person's intentions are? The answer is, in all sorts of ways, and we may even get it wrong in the apparently most favorable cases. But such facts as these—that there is no mechanical decision procedure for identifying an author's intentions, or for determining whether or not a work is a work of fiction or whether an expression is used metaphorically—
And there are even cruder appeals of the deconstructivis
 Perhaps the reason that Derrida and Culler have such an odd reading of Plato's and Aristotle's remarks about the relation of speech and writing is that they are unaware that the Greeks of antiquity usually read aloud. Our practice of reading silently with the mouth closed was a "rare accomplishment"
 On the question of truth, Culler wants to have it both ways. He says that truth is a kind of fiction (p. 181) and that "truth is both what can be demonstrated within an accepted framework and what simply is the case, whether or not anyone could believe it or validate it" (p. 154; my italics). The italicized phrase is not consistent with the idea of truth as fiction, nor is it in the spirit of deconstruction.
 I said that deconstruction had found little appeal among professional philosophers. But there are some notable exceptions, much prized by deconstructioni
15 October 2007
The use of "reaching out to someone" in biz-land when what is meant is "communicating," and usually, "communicating about some moronic project for which I, the communicator, want 'buy-in' to cover my ass."
People "reach out" when they are either drowning or experiencing some out-of-the-ordinary emotional state. Perhaps high-level diplomats, when they aren't judging how best to screw the other side, will "reach out."
The overuse of the phrase makes me want to retch -- more cheapening of emotion (i.e., creeping sentimentalism) and degrading of language.
(This has been a reaction of the Bullshit Detection System. Had this been a test, you wouldn't be puking right now.)
The NYT has been pushing the story that the Israeli air strike on Syria on September 6 came in response to intelligence that Syria was building a nuclear reactor at the site with clandestine North Korean help. There are reasons to question the accuracy of the Israeli story, which at some points has included allegations that there was evidence of enriched nuclear material at the site; such material could only be produced at the end of a long research and construction project, not at the beginning. The Israelis are trigger-happy and their intelligence on the Arab world is most often sloppy (the then head of Mossad is still insisting that Iraq had WMD), so one cannot assume there was anything to their apprehensions. In the absence of any inspection of the bombed site, one cannot assume there wasn't, either. The strike probably killed the November peace process summit that Condi Rice had been working toward; Syria says it won't attend.
Retired CIA analyst of Arab affairs Ray Close tells us what he thinks about it all:
"This is my Monday morning (speculative) analysis of the mysterious Israeli air attack on Syria on September 6, 2007 . . :
1. The Israelis offered us intelligence that Syria is beginning to develop a nuclear capability based on North Korean technology. They urged the US to cooperate with them in mounting a military attack to destroy the Syrian site. The advantages of this action, as presented to the Bush administration with great urgency by the Israelis, would be:
a. To preempt a new and dangerous violation of Israeli and American proliferation red lines before the Syrian program gets too far along (citing the Iranian experience for justification);
b. To intimidate and embarrass Syria; throw a scare into Iran; and restore Israel's deterrence credibility. (The historic examples of dramatically successful and awe-inspiring Israeli operations at Entebbe and Osirak, among others, still have great psychological and emotional impact.)
2. The more cautious and thoughtful members of the Bush administration opposed offering Israel the full participatory collaboration of the United States on the grounds that:
a. The Israeli intelligence in this case was not entirely persuasive, recalling instances of flawed intelligence of similar origin that misinformed some key US actions before and during the Iraq war;
b. If covert US-Israeli collaboration in this operation (technically an act of war) were actually proffered, this would eventually become known. The accuracy and authenticity of the Israeli intelligence on which the operational decision was justified would (in the absence of more credible supporting evidence from independent US sources), become the subject of heated public debate all over the world, and opponents of the Bush administration would argue with potentially devastating effect that this was final proof that Bush neocons have continually (in fact, going back many years) been duped by deliberate Israeli disinformation operations aimed at scaring America into adopting a policy of more overt and aggressive military cooperation with Israel;
c. Even if the Israeli intelligence were finally revealed to contain some credible evidence of Syria's long-range ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons and of North Korea's culpability in abetting those plans, the revelation of US-Israeli covert military collaboration against Syria at this critical time would, over the short term, endanger George W. Bush's desperate hopes of achieving some dramatic diplomatic successes before the end of his administration ---- most importantly with respect to North Korea and next month's planned Middle East Peace talks here in the US.
3. Ongoing heated arguments within the administration over whether or not to coordinate US and Israeli actions and reactions in this instance have been won, at least temporarily, by the side that gives higher priority to preserving and sustaining the diplomatic efforts, on the grounds that short-term progress in both the North Korean and Israeli-Palestinian situations should trump, at least for the time being, the acknowledged high value also attached to the more aggressive alternative measures urgently and vigorously advocated by the Olmert government in Israel and by Israel's supporters here in the United States.
4. There are undoubtedly some Democratic notables, in key Congressional positions of leadership and on the electoral hustings, who have been officially briefed (or who have been independently informed by interested third parties) of the whole set of considerations outlined above, and who have, for reasons best known to themselves, decided to support the more cautious objective of keeping this potentially explosive issue under wraps for as long as possible. (I don't discount at all the possibility that some support, probably in the form of technical intelligence, was nevertheless indeed provided to the Israeli planners by the US before or during the bombing operation. That just qualifies as a small skeleton in the closet compared to the backlash we would suffer for active operational collaboration in such an undertaking.)
Personally, I believe that the most persuasive reason for studied silence on this subject, on the part of both Republicans and Democrats, is the reluctance (call it fear) of individual politicians that they might be put in a position of appearing to criticize Israel for poor judgment (or even deliberate deception), and thereby appearing to oppose intimate collaboration with Israel (yes, even in acts of illegitimate preemptive military action) against "supporters of terrorism".
I would add the following personal comments to my analysis of the situation:
Having dealt with Arabs for more than fifty years now, often in situations very similar to this one, I have no trouble understanding why the Syrian reaction to the Israeli bombing attack last month has been carefully muted. Asad cannot afford a military confrontation with Israel at this time. His air force and army could be effectively wiped out by the IDF in a few hours. And he has no desire to broadcast the fact that his air defense forces (some of which, I am told, consist of very expensive new ground-to-air rocketry purchased from Russia but not yet operational) were impotent to respond in the face of such a deep and brazen Israeli penetration of the Syrian motherland. It would be plainly foolhardy for the Syrians to attempt confrontation with the IDF when their military establishment is in such a parlous state as it is today. I therefore find it perfectly understandable that Asad has chosen not to fly off the handle over this incident, and why his Arab neighbors and supposed brothers in arms have likewise decided that the better part of valor is to pretend they haven't noticed.
I recall in the period right after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when I was in liaison with the Saudis, that the Israeli Air Force used to make frequent very low level runs over the Saudi airbase at Tobuk, in the northern part of the country. As they skimmed the "deck", they would drop empty fuel tanks on the runways, near where the Saudi fighter planes were lined up, just to remind those on the ground that the empty tanks could very easily have been 500-pound bombs. It was nothing more than an arrogant demonstration of contempt for Saudi impotence. It worked. The RSAF never fired a shot, and never scrambled a single interceptor. They would complain to me, and I would duly forward their protests to CIA HQS. We never got even a polite acknowledgement back from the Israelis, who, in their arrogance, were no doubt cynically amused. So I can easily imagine Bashar al-Asad's decision to play this current incident in a very low key! It is not a mark of cowardice, but of realism and prudence.
Similarly, I recall when Prince Fahd bin Abdal Aziz called me to a meeting very late one evening in the early days of the 1973 war and asked me to send an urgent personal message from him to Richard Nixon informing the president that he had felt obliged to contribute a brigade of Saudi troops to the Golan front to support the Syrian offensive there, but that he had personally instructed the commander of the unit not to fire a single shot. That, Fahd told me with considerable emotion and obvious sincerity, was his solemn promise to his American friend. Again, prudence, wisdom, and desire to maintain a traditional and mutually valuable relationship --- motives that were not, I regret to say, received in Washington with the respect and appreciation that they deserved."
Letter: 'Failure Risks Devastating Consequences' By Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, Carla Hills, Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, Thomas R. Pickering, et al
From the NYRB. More cracks in the facade, all other interpretations of this letter aside...
Here's the whole enchilada, in case you don't like clicking links:
Volume 54, Number 17 · November 8, 2007
'Failure Risks Devastating Consequences'
By Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, Carla Hills, Nancy Kassebaum-Baker
, Thomas R. Pickering, Brent Scowcroft et al.
The following letter on the Middle East peace conference scheduled for Annapolis, Maryland, in late November, was sent by its signers on October 10 to President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The statement is a joint initiative of the US/Middle East Project, Inc. (General Brent Scowcroft, chairman, International Board, and Henry Siegman, president), the International Crisis Group (Gareth Evans, president), and the New America Foundation/AmerThe Israeli-Palestinian peace conference announced by President Bush and scheduled for November presents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a two-state solution. The Middle East remains mired in its worst crisis in years, and a positive outcome of the conference could play a critical role in stemming the rising tide of instability and violence. Because failure risks devastating consequences in the region and beyond, it is critically important that the conference succeed.
ican Strategy Program (Steven Clemons, director).
Bearing in mind the lessons of the last attempt at Camp David seven years ago at dealing with the fundamental political issues that divide the two sides, we believe that in order to be successful, the outcome of the conference must be substantive, inclusive, and relevant to the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians.The international conference should deal with the substance of a permanent peace: Because a comprehensive peace accord is unattainable by November, the conference should focus on the endgame and endorse the contours of a permanent peace, which in turn should be enshrined in a Security Council resolution. Israeli and Palestinian leaders should strive to reach such an agreement. If they cannot, the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, and UN Secretary General)—under whose aegis the conference ought to be held—should put forward its own outline, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and the 2003 Road Map. It should reflect the following:
- Two states, based on the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor, reciprocal, and agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap;
- Jerusalem as home to two capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods falling under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty;
- Special arrangements for the Old City, providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them;
- A solution to the refugee problem that is consistent with the two-state solution, addresses the Palestinian refugees' deep sense of injustice, as well as provides them with meaningful financial compensation and resettlement assistance;
- Security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty.
The conference should not be a one-time affair. It should set in motion credible and sustained permanent status negotiations under international supervision and with a timetable for their completion, so that both a two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative's full potential (normal, peaceful relations between Israel and all Arab states) can be realized.The international conference should be inclusive:
The international conference should produce results relevant to the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians: Too often in the past, progress has been stymied by the gap between lofty political statements and dire realities on the ground. The conference therefore should also result in agreement on concrete steps to improve living conditions and security, including a mutual and comprehensive cease-fire in the West Bank and Gaza, an exchange of prisoners, prevention of weapons smuggling, cracking down on militias, greater Palestinian freedom of movement, the removal of unjustified checkpoints, dismantling of Israeli outposts, and other tangible measures to accelerate the process of ending the occupation.
- In order to enhance Israel's confidence in the process, Arab states that currently do not enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel should attend the conference.
- We commend the administration for its decision to invite Syria to the conference; it should be followed by genuine engagement. A breakthrough on this track could profoundly alter the regional landscape. At a minimum, the conference should launch Israeli-Syrian talks under international auspices.
- As to Hamas, we believe that a genuine dialogue with the organization is far preferable to its isolation; it could be conducted, for example, by the UN and Quartet Middle East envoys. Promoting a cease-fire between Israel and Gaza would be a good starting point.
It is of utmost importance, if the conference is to have any credibility, that it coincide with a freeze in Israeli settlement expansion. It is impossible to conduct a serious discussion on ending the occupation while settlement expansion proceeds apace. Efforts also should focus on alleviating the situation in Gaza and allowing the resumption of its economic life.
These three elements are closely interconnected;
one cannot occur in the absence of the others. Unless the conference yields substantive results on permanent status, neither side will have the motivation or public support to take difficult steps on the ground. If Syria or Hamas is ostracized, prospects that they will play a spoiler role increase dramatically. This could take the shape of escalating violence from the West Bank or from Gaza, either of which would overwhelm any political achievement, increase the political cost of compromises for both sides, and negate Israel's willingness or capacity to relax security restrictions. By the same token, a comprehensive cease-fire or prisoner exchange is not possible without Hamas's cooperation. And unless both sides see concrete improvements in their lives, political agreements are likely to be dismissed as mere rhetoric, further undercutting support for a two-state solution.
The fact that the parties and the international community appear—after a long, costly seven-year hiatus—to be thinking of resolving the Israeli-Palesti
nian conflict is welcome news. Because the stakes are so important, it is crucial to get it right. That means having the ambition as well as the courage to chart new ground and take bold steps.
former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter
Lee H. Hamilton,
former Congressman and Co-chair of the Iraq Study Group
former US Trade Representative under President George H.W. Bush
Thomas R. Pickering,
of State under President Bill Clinton
former National Security Adviser to President Gerald Ford and President George H.W. Bush
Theodore C. Sorensen,
former Special Counsel and Adviser to President John F. Kennedy
former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System
When the British Medical Journal ran a poll on the proposed boycott of Israeli academics, a firestorm of letters resulted; the author of the blog above -- Asad Khan, Specialist Registrar, Respiratory Medicine, Wythenshawe Hospital, Manchester -- sent in this response (you may have to search for his name, or the title, "Go and see the truth for yourself. I did," on the page).
The blog linked above is his full report.
Thanks to Kim Hamilton-Bobrow for bringing this to my attention.
14 October 2007
...Hmmm...and the Demz knew all about it...
...Hmmm....this country is finished, and was finished long ago. 9/11, and its sequel, has only brought it all to the surface. Well, a century of empire, fifty years of a national-security state, and what do you expect?